Public-private partnerships, management capacity and public service efficiency by Andrews, Rhys & Entwistle, Tom
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/72476/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Andrews, Rhys William and Entwistle, Thomas Walter 2015. Public-private partnerships,
management capacity and public service efficiency. Policy and Politics 43 (2) , pp. 273-290.
10.1332/030557314X13917703359707 file 
Publishers page: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tpp/pap/pre-...
<http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tpp/pap/pre-prints/content-PP_PP_033>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
 1 
Public-private partnerships, management capacity and public 
service efficiency 
Dr Rhys Andrews (AndrewsR4@cardiff.ac.uk) 
Dr Tom Entwistle (EntwistleT@cardiff.ac.uk), Cardiff Business School 
 
Summary. By working with business, public organisations are assumed to 
benefit from: a more contestable procurement process; access to private 
sector entrepreneurialism and the realisation of previously untapped scale 
economies. Nevertheless, realization of these benefits may be contingent 
upon an expansion of management capacity to cope with increased 
transaction costs. We examine the relationship between a commitment to 
public-private partnership, management capacity and the productive efficiency 
of a set of English local authorities. We find that only those authorities with 
very strong management capacity are able to realise productive efficiency 
gains from public-private partnership. Theoretical and practical implications 
are discussed. 
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Introduction 
In response to the harsher fiscal environment heralded by the credit crunch of 
2008, governments around the world are redoubling their efforts to ensure the 
efficiency of public services. As in the past, the claim that the private sector 
can deliver services more efficiently than the state alternative, provides a key 
inspiration for reform (Christoffersen, Paldam and Wurtz, 2007; Donahue and 
Zeckhauser, 2011; Hodge and Greve, 2007). Theorists attribute the private 
sector’s efficiency advantage to three distinct mechanisms. The first – a 
contestability effect – might result from procurement processes which put 
suppliers into competitive or potentially competitive situations. The second – 
an ownership effect – suggests the possibility of benefitting from the private 
sector’s keener eye for opportunities to maximise the value of assets. The 
third – a scale effect – may result from the fact that because private 
contractors can provide specialist services to a number of small public 
agencies, they can pass on the benefit in terms of lower costs and expertise 
which result from economies of scale.   
Although policy-makers across the world continue to laud the merits of 
public-private partnership, evidence of realised efficiency gains resulting from 
their adoption remains mixed (Andrews, 2010). In fact, there is much reason 
to suspect that such relationships lead to deteriorations in the quality and 
efficiency of public services (see, for example, Davies, 2010). The varied 
results reported in the literature may in part be explained by the fact that the 
gains promised by public-private partnerships could be contingent upon the 
management capacity of the contracting public agency; public-private 
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partnerships need to be managed if they are to be successful (O’Toole and 
Meier, 2004; Bhatti, Olsen and Pedersen, 2009).  
This paper asks two questions: first, whether a commitment to public-
private partnership is associated with gains in efficiency; and second whether 
these gains are contingent on the management capacity of the client agency? 
To answer these questions, we examine the relationship between a 
commitment to public-private partnership, management capacity and the 
productive efficiency of a sample of English local authorities. In the first part of 
the paper, we review the theoretical benefits of public-private partnership. 
Next, we reflect upon the potential moderating effects that management 
capacity might have on the realisation of increased efficiency. In the third 
section, we introduce our data and methods, before our findings are 
presented, and the theoretical and practical implications discussed in the 
conclusion.  
 
Public-private partnerships and public service efficiency 
Public organisations can engage the private sector in public service delivery in 
a number of different ways. They can open clearly specified functions to a 
competitive tendering process and then contract with the organisation which 
promises best value. Alternatively, they may externalise – or in more loaded 
terms – privatise the delivery of a whole service making it the responsibility of 
a non-state organisation. Finally they may seek to negotiate a hybrid form of 
organisation – often described as a public-private partnership – which is 
based on mixed ownership and a high level of trust (Bajari, McMillan and 
Tadelis, 2009).  
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In truth, of course, the distinctions between these approaches are fuzzy 
and resistant to hard and fast categorisation (Linder 1999). Governments, and 
commentators, often use the partnership label to describe relationships which 
in formal terms might seem closer to contracting or externalisation. Bracketing 
off ‘when is a partnership really a partnership’ type questions, we take the 
relative commitment of an organisation to contracting, externalisation or public 
private partnership as constitutive of a general attitude of receptiveness, on 
their part, to the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of public 
services. The literature suggests a number of reasons to think that engaging 
the private sector in public service delivery might endow significant efficiency 
advantages. We consider three such reasons or mechanisms: contestability, 
ownership and scale.  
The contestability effect is realised most clearly through a procurement 
process in which service providers – whether of back office functions like HR 
and IT or public facing services like refuse collection and street cleansing – 
are chosen through competitive contracting (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). 
Advocates argue that providers subject to these processes will focus on their 
core performance – improving the quality of the work and reducing the costs 
wherever possible – for fear that a failure to please their clients will lead to a 
loss of business (Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010). In this vein, it can be 
argued that it does not matter whether contracts are awarded to private, public 
or third sector suppliers since it is the process of competitive tendering and 
the state of contestability which provides the drive for increased efficiency 
(Hodge, 1998). It is possible, of course, that a public-private partnership may 
be long lasting and rather cosy. Indeed one of the important changes in public 
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procurement practice in recent years has been the switch from short term to 
so called relational contracts (Parker and Hartley, 2003; Entwistle and Martin, 
2005). It seems likely that these close or enduring partnership arrangements 
will score less well on contestability grounds than short lived, low trust 
contracts. 
 It is also reasonable to assume, however, that local authorities that are 
positively disposed to working with the private sector – as evidenced through 
a commitment to either contracting, partnership or whole sale externalisation – 
will enjoy the benefits of stronger contestability effects than those authorities 
that are determined to protect public sector monopolies. Although 
contestability might be strongest in those services subject to regular and 
specific contracting, at a minimum it requires neither regular contracting nor 
perfect competition so much as the fear that markets can be contested by 
rivals (Baumol and Willig, 1986). Empirical work lends some support to the 
efficiency advantages of contestability. Caves and Christensen (1980, p.974) 
find that ‘the oft noted inefficiency of government enterprises stems from their 
isolation from effective competition rather than their public ownership per se’. 
Hodge concludes that ‘the weight of evidence appears to support the notion 
that, on average, the unit cost of services is reduced through competitive 
tendering of public services’ (Hodge, 1998, p.98).  
The ownership effect stems not from the competitiveness of 
procurement processes, but from the intrinsic qualities of privately owned 
organisations. Ownership or property rights theories suggest that public 
ownership ‘is diffused among all members of society’ such that there is ‘little 
economic incentive for any owner to monitor the behaviour of the firm's 
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management’ (Caves and Christensen, 1980, p.959). In the private sector, by 
contrast – with much smaller numbers of owners and assets that are easily 
valued and exchanged – there is ‘a much larger interest in knowing and 
controlling costs’ (Christoffersen, Paldam and Wurtz, 2007, p. 312). In such a 
way, differences in ownership are likely to translate into fundamentally 
different attitudes to the search for value. As the economists express it, the 
private sector is more attuned to the opportunity costs of the resources used 
in service delivery. More broadly, commentators describe the different basis of 
ownership as translating into a private sector culture which is more 
enterprising, flexible, innovative and less risk averse than its public 
counterpart (Donahue and Zeckhauser, 2011; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
More focused on outcomes than formal decision-making procedures and 
administrative oversight, private sector organisations can also be less 
hampered by bureaucratic rules and controls (Rainey, 1989).  
Although local authorities will see something of these benefits by 
working with private organisations in contracting type arrangements, the full 
advantages of private management will only be seen in those cases where the 
ownership of assets is transferred from the public sector through a process of 
externalisation or privatisation. Mixed ownership arrangements offer a hybrid 
arrangement which promises to capture some of the benefits of private sector 
ownership while maintaining public accountability (Bovaird, 2004). Again 
empirical work provides some support for the ownership effect. On the basis 
of a study of oil companies in the public and private sectors, Wolf finds results 
‘supportive of the hypothesis that ‘‘ownership matters’’ in the sense that 
private ownership encourages better performance and greater efficiency than 
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state ownership does.’ (Wolf, 2009 p.2650). Boitani, Nicolini and Scarpa 
(2013) find that the productivity of mixed ownership firms – hybrid or 
partnership type arrangements – is determined by the degree of private 
ownership. 
The third driver of efficiency stems from the scale of service delivery. 
The literature provides a number of reasons to think that the public sector is 
not well placed to capture economies of scale. Christoffersen, Paldam and  
Wurtz (2007) suggest that the absence of free market contestability and 
private ownership mean that public managers are more attuned to pleasing 
stakeholders than hunting out scale economies. But even with the requisite 
motivation, public managers may struggle to find scale. For example, although 
in population terms English local authorities are large by international 
standards (John, 2010), some of the functions they are responsible for are 
performed on a relatively small scale. While in theory small jurisdictions could 
be combined through public-public partnership arrangements, the conflicting 
accountability arrangements of statutory organisations can make this difficult.  
Whether in IT, refuse collection, or general back office functions like the 
processing of taxes and benefits, the private sector organisations providing 
local authority services may be considerably larger and more specialised than 
their public sector clients. Local authorities which partner with these 
organisations may then be able to enjoy the efficiency gains – apparent in 
lower prices and higher service quality – which result from providing services 
on a greater scale (Christoffersen, Paldam and Wurtz, 2007; Warner and Bel, 
2008). Of course in formal terms scale economies require neither contracting 
nor the transfer of ownership to the private sector. Whether for good or bad 
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reasons public organisations find it difficult, however, to collaborate across 
boundaries in the interests of increased scale. The benefits of scale are, then 
key to the offer made by large private sector outsourcing businesses. Again 
the literature provides support for the scale effect. In a study of the cleaning 
costs of Danish primary schools, Christoffersen, Paldam and Wurtz (2007, 
p.312) find that the significant differences in the cost of public and private 
cleaning ‘arises from differences in the ability to exploit economies of scale’. 
Taken together these lines of argument suggest that public-private 
partnerships – manifested to different degrees through contracting, 
externalisation, or hybrid forms of governance – have the potential to deliver 
significant efficiency improvements. Even so, there may be several 
unintended consequences associated with private sector involvement in public 
service delivery that could problematize their utility for public policy-makers. 
Private sector involvement may herald staffing reductions, declining service 
quality or increasing inequity in the distribution of services (see Davies, 2010; 
Knapp et al., 1999). That is to say a broader understanding of efficiency – 
embracing distributive, dynamic and allocative senses of the term (Andrews 
and Entwistle, 2013) – may suggest a rather different calculation of costs and 
benefits. But even within the relatively narrow remit provided by the notion of 
productive efficiency, the realisation of any of the putative benefits attributable 
to public-private partnership will depend on the capacity of public 
organisations to manage their relationships with the private sector effectively. 
It is to this question that we now turn. 
 
The role of management capacity 
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While contestability, ownership and scale arguments all suggest that private 
organisations might be capable of delivering more efficient services than their 
public counterparts, there is no guarantee that the public sector can capture 
those gains in any one case. The translation of potential into realised 
efficiency improvements depends upon the ability of the local authority to 
extract and then deploy those savings. That is to say, the realisation of 
efficiency is contingent upon the management capacity of the local authority. 
While the blurry boundaries between contracting, partnership and 
externalisation warn against categorical distinctions, the nature of the 
management challenge depends upon the type of relationship with the private 
sector.  
 Contracting type relationships require principals to specify, monitor and 
manage the activities of private agents. Incomplete contract theorists point, 
however, to the problems of contracting for unforeseen eventualities in even 
short lived contracts (Hart, 2003; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1988). As Carson et al. (2003, p. 48) explain, albeit in a different context: 
‘Assessing and interpreting the supplier’s actions and being able to agree on 
the nature of profitable revisions depends squarely on the extant knowledge 
that the client possesses about the tasks in question’. The new partnership 
forms of procurement are supposed to solve this problem by binding both 
client and contractor into a high trust relationship which negate the need to 
anticipate all possible contingencies (Bovaird, 2004; Bajari, McMillan and 
Tadelis, 2009). In such a way, the management challenge changes from a 
legalistic one focused on compliance to a relational one requiring the 
development and maintenance of trust. While externalisation passes the 
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responsibility for service provision to another organisation altogether, the 
interdependencies between organisations remain. Local authorities might then 
have a regulatory (Majone, 1994), steering (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) or 
stakeholder (Freeman, Wicks and Parmar, 2004) type relationship with the 
arms-length organisations responsible for delivering formerly public services.   
Public management scholars have become increasingly concerned 
with exploring the ways in which organisations build the administrative or 
management capacity to deal with public service delivery problems (Ingraham 
and Donahue, 2000; Ingraham, 2007). Management capacity is particularly 
important in the administration of contracts or networks because without it the 
potential efficiencies of working with the private sector might be squandered in 
economic rent. Brown and Potoski (2004, pp. 665-666) explain: ‘Even under 
conditions that favor contracting, public managers must have the skills to 
understand market operations and the tools to address market failures.’ 
Amirkhanyan (2008, p. 665) too, observes that, ‘as counties minimise their 
roles as service providers’ they need to put in place arrangements to protect 
the quality of services and the interests of low income clients. This includes 
making provision for effective risk management and information-sharing 
between the public and private partners (see 6, Bellamy and Raab, 2010). 
The management capacity of public organisations constitutes their 
‘intrinsic ability to marshal, develop, direct, and control its human, physical 
and information capital to support the discharge of its policy directions’ 
(Ingraham and Donahue, 2000, p. 294). The organisation-wide potential for 
action resides principally within the corporate centre of organisations. Since 
staff within central administrative departments deal with cross-cutting issues, 
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such as finance, performance management and personnel, rather than more 
narrow functional responsibilities, they are especially well-placed to make a 
contribution to the broader policy goals of public organisations, such as the 
management of relationships with the private sector. By investing more time 
and money in the central administrative office, public organisations can amass 
a kind of ‘slack’ resource that can be reconfigured, redirected or redeployed in 
order to respond to management challenges. Central administrative managers 
may, for example, be moved from task to task in response to changing 
priorities in a manner especially beneficial for overcoming the challenges of 
managing and monitoring private organisations involved in public service 
delivery.  
Although the resources devoted to administration are, on average, far 
lower in local authorities than in some public organizations (e.g. universities, 
see Andrews and Boyne, forthcoming), the level of expenditure on 
administration varies considerably between authorities. This is suggestive of 
some ‘slack’ having been created (or as it is termed in the management 
literature, ‘absorbed’ (Singh, 1986)) within the corporate centre in some 
organisations for purposes other than providing a standard package of 
corporate support services. In this sense, the concept of management 
capacity signifies the stock of administrative resources that can be mobilised 
in support of proactive or reactive efforts to shape, or respond to, the business 
of managing private sector contractors and partners. While it is conceivable 
that management capacity may itself have a positive independent effect on 
public service efficiency, its true contribution may be to enable local 
authorities to deal with core strategic management challenges, such as cross-
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sectoral service coordination. Accordingly, we anticipate that organisations 
with a larger central administrative component will be better able to reap the 
benefits of public-private partnerships. 
  
Data and measures 
Our units of analysis are English local authorities. These are multi-purpose 
elected bodies which receive approximately two-thirds of their income from 
central government. They deliver services in the areas of education, social 
care, land-use planning, waste management, public housing, leisure and 
culture, and welfare benefits. During the study period, there were 386 local 
authorities of five types in England. 32 London boroughs, 36 metropolitan 
boroughs, and 46 unitary authorities primarily found in urban areas, with a 
two-tier system in rural areas composed of 34 county councils administering 
education and social services, and 238 district councils providing welfare and 
regulatory services. In this study, we focus on single and upper tier local 
authorities because these organisations are responsible for the large strategic 
services, such as education and social services, which account for the 
majority of public expenditure in the local government system.  
 
Dependent variables 
Productive efficiency To gauge the productive efficiency of local authorities we 
seek to create a ratio of the financial inputs to the overall outputs/outcomes 
delivered by each organisation. We therefore follow Borge, Falch and 
Tovmo’s (2008) approach to measuring the productive efficiency of local 
authorities by constructing a measure grading the quality of the service output 
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of single and upper tier local authorities in England. To do so, we draw upon 
the core service performance element of the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment (CPA) that was undertaken undertaken by the Audit Commission 
(a central government regulatory agency) in 2008.  
Central government performance classifications, such as the CPA, are 
important (though contestable) means for assessing the achievements of local 
governments. While such classifications are arguably susceptible to political 
bias (Bache 2003), they rely on audited performance indicators, minimizing 
the potential for external interference in the inspection process. Moreover, the 
CPA was a performance measure that, rightly or wrongly, mattered to local 
governments themselves (see Laffin 2008), influencing the tenure of both 
senior managers (Boyne et al., 2010) and councillors (Boyne et al. 2009). 
Six key local authority services (children and young people, adult social 
care, environment, housing, libraries and leisure, and benefits) were graded 1 
(lowest) to 4 (highest) on the basis of statutory performance indicators (Audit 
Commission, 2002). Each service score was then weighted to reflect its 
relative importance and budget (children and young people and adult social 
care = 4; environment and housing = 2; libraries and leisure, and welfare 
benefits = 1). These weighted scores were then summed to provide an overall 
service performance judgement, ranging from 14 (11 for county councils 
which are not responsible for housing or benefits services) to 56 (44 for 
county councils). To ensure these scores are comparable, we take each 
organisation’s overall score as a percentage of the maximum possible score.  
For the input side of the productive efficiency ratio, we draw upon the 
total service expenditure in 2008 (minus expenditure on central 
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administration) of each local authority. A measure of productive efficiency is 
then derived by dividing core service performance by the service expenditure 
measure. This productive efficiency ratio indicates the financial cost of 
producing a given unit of service output/outcome (Ostroff and Schmitt, 1993). 
Unlike the contract prices and narrow output measures used in much of the 
work on productive efficiency (Boyne, 1998), our methodology provides a 
measure of the quality of public service delivery outputs per unit of 
expenditure. Organisations which focus purely on maximising outputs or 
minimising inputs will not perform well against this measure. 
 
Independent variables 
Public-private partnerships index: Data on commitment to public-private 
partnership were drawn from an email survey of managers in English local 
authorities administered in late 2007. Email addresses for the entire 
population of senior and middle managers in English local government were 
drawn from a national contacts database, and questionnaires were then 
delivered as an excel file attached to an email. Responses were aggregated 
from senior and middle managers in each organisation to overcome sample 
bias problems associated with surveying a higher proportion of informants 
from one organisational level (Walker and Enticott, 2004). The total number of 
potential informants was 6,975, and the number of actual respondents was 
1,082, yielding a response rate of 15.5 per cent. Responses were received 
from 28 London boroughs, 36 Metropolitan boroughs, 45 unitary authorities, 
31 county councils and 188 district councils.  
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Since only local authorities with responses from each of the two 
echelons (senior and middle management) were included in our analysis, 
some cases were lost when we aggregated these echelons up to the 
organisational level. As a result, our analysis was conducted on 86 out of a 
population of 148 single and upper-tier local authorities. For this sample, we 
received on average 5.1 responses per authority, which compares well with 
the 2-5 responses recommended for multiple informant studies of 
organisational characteristics (see Wagner, Rau and Lindemann, 2010). No 
statistically significant differences between our sample and the population of 
local authorities were found on key characteristics such as deprivation, 
population and ethnic diversity, so we are able to draw on a representative 
sample of local authorities. Time-trend tests for nonrespondent bias 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977) revealed no significant differences in the 
views of early and late respondents. 
We draw upon three separate measures evaluating the relationships 
between local authorities and the private sector, which we use to construct an 
index of commitment to the involvement of the private sector in public service 
provision. First, the extent to which local authorities contract services out to 
private sector providers was used to tap contestability in service provision. 
This was gauged by asking survey respondents to indicate on a scale of 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) that their organisation pursues “a 
policy of contracting out/outsourcing”. This measure provides a good proxy for 
contracting-out played in the absence of detailed financial accounts of the 
proportion of services contracted out during the study period. Second, the 
extent to which local authorities externalise service provision or pass them 
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across to private firms was gauged by asking respondents to indicate whether 
their organisation pursued “a policy of externalisation”. This captures the 
effects of a commitment to moving services from public to private ownership. 
Third, we use a broad-based measure to capture commitment to alternative 
partnership arrangements with the private sector. Specifically, we asked 
respondents to indicate the extent to which their organisation ‘works in 
partnership with the private sector’.  
Drawing on these three measures we construct an index of 
commitment to public-private relationships using principal components 
analysis. This index demonstrates strong inter-item scale reliability 
(Cronbach’s Alpha score of .83, see Nunnally, 1978), which indicates that in 
combination the separate items are capturing a distinctive empirical construct. 
The descriptive statistics and the factor loadings for these measures are 
shown in Table 1. 
 
[Position of TABLE 1] 
 
Management capacity: We measure management capacity in English local 
authorities as the expenditure on central administration per resident. This is 
similar to the measure of central staffing capacity used in studies of private 
organisations (Goold and Campbell, 2002). Data on central administration 
costs are collected annually in accordance with the Chartered Institute for 
Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA)’s Financial Reporting Standard 17. 
They cover expenditure on central services (e.g. finance, internal audit, legal) 
and management and support services (e.g. human resources, IT, 
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organisational development). The principal source of this expenditure is 
staffing costs, thus indicating that a higher level of central administrative 
spending will likely reflect a larger stock of human resources within the 
administrative centre of local authorities. Similar results were observed when 
we used a measure gauging administrative expenditure as a percentage of 
total expenditure (or the administrative intensity) of each local authority 
(available on request). 
 
Control variables  
The Formula Spending Share (FSS) per resident was used as a measure of 
quantity of service needs. This index of needs was used by central 
government to distribute grant funding to local authorities and was based on 
indicators, such as the number of schoolchildren and elderly people in the 
local population. We also include quintiles for the average ward score on the 
indices of deprivation in 2007 as a further measure of service need. This 
captures levels of disadvantage in: income, employment, health, education, 
housing, crime, and environment. 
We measure three dimensions of diversity of service needs: age, ethnic 
and social class.  The proportions of the various sub-groups within each of 
these different demographic categories identified by the 2001 UK national 
census within a local authority area (e.g. ages 0-4, Black African, Small 
Employers and Own Account Workers) was squared and the sum of these 
squares subtracted from 10,000. The resulting measures give a proxy for 
‘fractionalisation’ within an area, with a high score on the index reflecting a 
high level of diversity (see Trawick and Howsen, 2006).  
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The discretionary resources available to each local authority was 
derived by dividing its total expenditure by its FSS in the same year.  This 
shows whether councils were spending above or below the level deemed 
necessary to meet their service needs. The relative size of public 
organisations was measured using population figures for each local area from 
the 2001 national census.  Local authorities serving big populations can 
accrue economies of scale by distributing fixed costs over more units of 
output, increasing levels of professional specialisation and expertise, and 
attracting better quality staff and politicians (Boyne, 1995). While the FSS 
compensated for the geographical dispersion of clients, local authorities in 
urban areas may still be able to reap scope economies by offering multiple 
services from the same site (Grosskopf and Yaisawamg, 1990). Population 
figures were therefore divided by the area of each local authority to measure 
density. A dichotomous variable coded 1 for local authorities within London 
and 0 otherwise is also included to control for higher labour and capital costs 
in the capital city. Administrative costs, for example, are marginally higher in 
London for the sample of local authorities used in this study (t-test for 
difference in means result at p.<0.1).  
Finally, the percentage share of the vote gained by the Labour Party in 
the most recent local election was included to capture the potential impact of a 
‘collectivist’ political disposition amongst local residents. Labour voters are 
generally seen as more committed to state provided services than their 
Conservative or Liberal Democrat counterparts (Clarke et al., 2004). The 
descriptive statistics and data sources for all our variables are listed in Table 
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2. Before being entered in the statistical model, population and population 
density were logged to correct for non-normal distributions. 
 
[Position of TABLE 2] 
 
Results  
We present two Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions in table 3: in 
model 1, our measure of productive efficiency is regressed on to the 
independent and control variables; in model 2, we add a variable that interacts 
(multiplies together) public-private relationships and management capacity to 
assess whether the efficiencies to be gained from public-private relationships 
are contingent on the capacity to manage those relationships. Ramsey’s 
(1969) RESET specification test indicated that the models do not suffer from 
omitted variable bias. 
Most of the control variables have the expected signs and some are 
statistically significant. Deprivation exhibits a strong negative relationship with 
productive efficiency, indicating that providing public services in 
disadvantaged areas is an especially challenging task. The measure of 
discretionary resources is negatively related to productive efficiency, which 
signifies that spending beyond the needs of a local population could be seen 
as an indicator of poor financial performance. Labour vote shares are 
positively related to productive efficiency, suggesting that in areas where there 
is a greater willingness to support public services local authorities may find it 
less difficult to make the best use of their resources. Historically, Labour 
authorities were seen as cost-inefficient, so it is possible that this finding 
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reflects our use of a measure of efficiency that incorporates the quality as well 
as the quantity of the outputs produced. The measures of quantity of need, 
demographic diversity and population size and density are unrelated to 
efficiency. Local authorities in London too are neither more nor less likely to 
be efficient than those benefiting from lower input prices outside the capital. 
 
[Position of TABLE 3] 
 
The findings in Table 3 indicate that a commitment to public-private 
relationships has no observable benefits for this sample of English local 
authorities. Such a commitment is neither positively nor negatively related to 
productive efficiency. At the same time, management capacity seems to have 
no positive or negative statistically significant influence on our measure of 
efficiency.  Even so, it is still conceivable that the benefits (and costs) of 
public-private relationships are simply contingent upon other inputs, such as 
management capacity. Correspondingly, it is also possible that capacity itself 
only produces beneficial outcomes when it is “put to the test” (see Gargan, 
1981). To investigate whether management capacity holds the key to the 
realisation of efficiencies through a commitment to public-private relationships, 
a variable interacting the two measures is entered in the statistical model.  
The coefficient for the interaction between a commitment to public-
private relationships and capacity is positive, as anticipated, and statistically 
significant. Thus, we find strong support for the suggestion that the benefits of 
a commitment to public-private relationships are more likely to become 
apparent when local authorities have more capacity for monitoring and 
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managing those relationships. To explore this interaction effect thoroughly, 
however, it is necessary to calculate the marginal effects of public-private 
relationships on efficiency at varying levels of management capacity. More 
specifically, this entails identifying at what level management capacity has a 
statistically significant impact on the relationship between public-private 
relationships and efficiency. Graphing the slope and confidence intervals of 
the marginal effects is the most effective way to present this information (see 
Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Accordingly, Figure 1 provides a graphical 
illustration of the moderating influence of management capacity on the 
relationship between a commiitment to public-private relationships and 
productive efficiency.  
 
[Position of FIGURE 1] 
 
The centre line in figure 1 illustrates the predicted values of productive 
efficiency depending upon varying levels of management capacity, while 
controlling for all the other variables included in our model. The dotted lines 
represent the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals for those 
predicted values. The area above the upper bound and below the horizontal 
zero line indicates the presence of a statistically significant relationship. The 
figure confirms that the relative level of management capacity is likely to have 
an important moderating effect on the relationship between a commitment to 
public-private relationships and productive efficiency. In fact, the cost 
implications of a commitment to public-private relationships become 
statistically indistinguishable from zero (where the upper confidence interval 
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meets the zero line on the graph) when management capacity is about a 
standard deviation below the mean level (approximately £13 per resident). 
Further analysis revealed that sixty-six local authorities had management 
capacity of this strength or higher (i.e. about three-quarters of the sample). 
At the same time, it appears to be the case that productive efficiency 
gains can be realised from relationships with the private sector. The area 
below the lower bound of the confidence intervals and above the horizontal 
zero line indicates the presence of a statistically significant relationship. 
However, the figure indicates that such gains can only be captured (at the 
point the lower confidence interval meets the zero line) when local authorities 
have management capacity which is about two standard deviations above the 
mean (approximately £60 per resident). Only two authorities had capacity of 
this strength. When these two authorities were excluded from the analysis, the 
benefits of capacity emerged at about one standard deviation above the mean 
(£40 per resident). Nine local authorities had capacity of this strength, which 
implies that only organisations with an extremely high degree of capacity are 
able to achieve the anticipated productive efficiency gains from a commitment 
to private involvement in service delivery;  a finding, which calls into question 
the efficiency case for public-private partnership.  
 
Discussion 
We asked two questions at the start of this paper: first, whether a commitment 
to public-private partnership is associated with greater efficiency; and second 
whether that efficiency is contingent on the management capacity of the public 
sector principal. Our analysis suggests that a commitment to public-private 
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partnership of itself does not improve productive efficiency. With appropriate 
levels of management capacity, public private partnerships can, however, be 
conducted in such a way as to avoid any potential deterioration of productive 
efficiency. Indeed, our data suggest that extremely high levels of capacity are 
needed to realise the productive efficiency gains that public-private 
partnerships promise.  
 The statistical results suggest that management capacity, in particular, 
may play a critical role in managing relationships with the private sector. 
Previous studies have highlighted the ways in which such relationships may 
require an expansion of capacity to manage the increased transaction costs 
associated with monitoring private contractors (O’Toole and Meier, 2004). We 
add to this evidence base by illustrating how that capacity can only lead to a 
positive performance pay-off when it has expanded to a very great degree, 
perhaps to the extent that other dysfunctional effects of ‘bureaucratic 
overload’ emerge. Our analysis also contributes to the public management 
literature in another important way. Public administration scholars increasingly 
draw attention to the benefits of strong administrative or management 
capacity for organisational functioning in general (see Ingraham, 2007), but 
comparatively few provide empirical tests to confirm these notions. We have 
illustrated the benefits of strong management capacity by theorising and 
empirically exploring its role in the management of public-private partnerships, 
thereby illustrating that capacity is an important resource that can be deployed 
to good effect by public organisations.  
The findings provide food for thought for those determined to promote 
the efficiency case for the involvement of the private sector in public service 
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delivery. They suggest that efficiency savings are far from guaranteed by 
these arrangements. Rather, the efficiency dividend of public private 
partnerships is contingent on the capacity of the organisation to manage the 
relationship and extract efficiency savings from it. Organisations considering 
these types of reform need to devote as much priority to the development of 
their capacity as they do the selection of the right partner. This 
recommendation is likely to be equally, if not more important, for the 
maintenance of social efficiency in the provision of public services. At the 
same time, the quality of the management capacity at the centre of the 
organisation is likely to matter, as well as the sheer quantity of resources 
available to deal with private sector partners.  
Grimshaw et al (2002) highlight that public organizations are often at a 
disadvantage when negotiating contracts with private contractors, especially 
those well-versed in the nuances of government contracting. Larger and more 
experienced firms, in particular, might place a greater burden on the 
management capacity within local authorities, requiring better negotiating 
skills and stronger legal controls. Hence, our findings may be more or less 
applicable depending upon the type of partners with whom local authorities 
are typically involved. Unfortunately, on this occasion we are unable to 
capture partner characteristics due to data limitations, and so cannot fully 
explore the contingent nature of the relationships we identify. Nevertheless, 
who the right partner is at any given time and in what circumstances and how 
they should be involved in local service production (if at all) are important 
questions that could form the focus of subsequent research on this topic. In 
fact, our findings raise several questions about the connection between 
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public-private relationships, capacity and efficiency that are worthy of further 
systematic analysis.  
We have argued, for example, that a commitment to involving the 
private sector in service delivery results in a blurring of different organisational 
forms: from contracting on the one hand, to whole sale externalisation on the 
other. The efficiency effects of these alternative relationships are in turn likely 
to be dependent upon different casual mechanisms: from contestability on the 
one hand to ownership and scale on the other. Our index of public-private 
relationships deliberately combines different organisational forms and their 
associated effects to capture the full range of those forms and effects in a 
single measure. Further work could however seek to unpack these different 
elements. Exploring, for example, which of the different forms – and which of 
the different causal mechanisms – works best in terms of delivering productive 
efficiency. Should local authorities look more to contracting type relationships 
emphasising contestability than different forms of externalisation focused 
more on the benefits of non-state ownership? 
Similarly, our measure of management capacity – focused as it is on 
the central administration within local authorities – leaves open the question of 
what type of capacity works best? Central administrative staff could be drawn 
from a number of different professional backgrounds and focussed on a 
bewildering range of different activities. Our data do not allow us to determine 
whether local authorities should employ financial, legal, human resource or 
procurement professionals to manage relationships with the private sector 
much less how those individuals should best spend their time. Detailed case 
studies in selected authorities could therefore throw extremely valuable light 
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on how public organisations deploy their store of human resources in the 
central administration to better manage their relationships with the private 
sector.  
Further questions might also be focused on different organisational and 
national contexts, especially as policies and attitudes towards public-private 
relationships vary greatly across different policy fields and countries. 
Systematic comparisons of public-private relationships, capacity and 
efficiency in these varied settings could therefore make a valuable contribution 
to the wider literature on the comparative performance of alternative forms of 
external relationships. In addition, investigation of the reciprocal effects of 
management capacity and public-private relationships over the medium to 
long-term would also provide a useful indication to scholars and policy-makers 
alike of the extent to which each may be responsible for an expansion in the 
other. To do this effectively, requires a panel data set, which can facilitate 
longitudinal analysis. Unfortunately, on this occasion, our survey data are 
restricted to a single year and so permit only cross-sectional analysis.  
To sum up, one important conclusion that can be drawn from our study 
is that further research needs to be conducted to uncover the full range of the 
organisational dynamics associated with the management of public-private 
partnerships. This may permit more informed deliberations about the most 
effective policy responses to the involvement of the private sector in public 
service provision.  However, another conclusion is that the challenges and 
costs associated with making public-private relationships work, may simply be 
so great that they outweigh any of the putative benefits from such 
relationships. As fiscal austerity continues to bite hard in the UK, fresh 
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evidence on the validity of these alternative perspectives on private 
involvement in public services could therefore play a vital role in shaping the 
public sector of the future.  
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Table 1 Public-private relationships measure 
 Mean Min Max S.E. S.D. Factor 
loading 
We pursue a 
policy of 
contracting out 
4.05 1.50 6.50 .13 1.17 .756 
We pursue a 
policy of 
externalisation 
4.11 1.67 6.50 .13 1.16 .907 
We work in 
partnership with 
the private sector 
5.37 2.90 5.37 .09 .89 .912 
Eigenvalue      2.23 
N=86 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
 
 Mean Min Max S.D. 
Productive efficiency 
(CPA/spend) 
.053 .030 .078 .010 
Public-private relationship 
index 
.00 -2.34 2.13 1.00 
Administrative capacity 25.45 1.92 84.34 14.57 
Control variables     
FSS per resident 1173.44 750.11 2299.57 259.60 
Deprivation (quintile) 3.0 1.0 5.0 1.41 
Age diversity 8731.71 8536.11 8855.00 59.04 
Ethnic diversity 2385.28 372.71 8452.82 209.00 
Social class diversity 8783.73 8664.20 8933.46 61.42 
Discretionary resources 1.203 .72 1.77 .10 
Population  358412.00 34563   
Population density 2151.38 70.91 10545.45 242.99 
London .19 .00 1.00 .39 
Labour vote share 28.26 4.44 56.70 10.87 
Data sources 
Core service 
performance 
Age diversity, ethnic 
diversity, population, 
population density, 
social class diversity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Service expenditure 
 
Standard Spending 
Assessment, 
discretionary 
resources 
Labour vote share 
 
 
Audit Commission (2008) Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment. London: Audit Commission. 
Office for National Statistics (2003) Census 2001, National Report 
for England and Wales. London: ONS. Age diversity comprised 12 
groups: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-44, 45-59, 60-64, 
65-74, 75-84, 85+. Ethnic diversity comprised 16 groups: White 
British, Irish, Other White, White and Black Caribbean, White and 
Black African, White and Asian, Other Mixed, Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Other Asian, Caribbean, African, Other Black, 
Chinese, Other Ethnic Group. Social class diversity comprised 12 
Socio-Economic Classifications: Large Employers and Higher 
Managerial Occupations, Higher Professional Occupations, Lower 
Managerial and Professional Occupations, Intermediate 
Occupations, Small Employers and Own Account Workers, Lower 
Supervisory and Technical Occupations, Semi-Routine Occupations, 
Routine Occupations, Never Worked, Long-Term Unemployed, Full-
time Students, Non-Classifiable. 
CIPFA (2009) CIPFA Finance and General Statistics, 2008/09. 
CIPFA: London. 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/localgovernment/localgovernmentfin
ance/ 
 
 
Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (2005). Local elections handbook 
2005. Plymouth: LGC Elections Centre. 
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Table 3 Public-private relationships and productive efficiency 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable β s.e. Β s.e. 
Public-private relationships 
(PPR) 
-.0003 .0007 -.0031** .0015 
Administrative capacity (AC) 9.48E-06 .0001 -.0004** .0002 
Interaction term 
    
PPR x AC   .0001** 4.57E-05 
FSS per resident -1.6E-05** 6.89E-06 -1.4E-05** 6.80E-06 
Deprivation -.0025** .0011 -.0029*** .0011 
Age diversity  -2.49E-05 1.74E-05 -1.96E-05 1.72E-05 
Ethnic diversity -9.13E-07 8.50E-07 -8.12E-07 8.32E-07 
Social class diversity -4.89E-06 1.82E-05 -9.84E-06 1.79E-05 
Discretionary resources -.0199** .0098 -.0205** .0096 
Population (log) .0021 .0021 .0033* .0016 
Population density (log) -.0004 .0010 -.0006 .0010 
London .0010 .0029 .0010 .0028 
Labour vote share .0002** .0001 .0003*** .0001 
Constant .3356** .1622 .3050** .1598 
F statistic 11.12***  11.10***  
R2 .65  .67  
Notes: number of observations = 86. * p   ≤ 0.10; ** p   ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed 
tests).  
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Figure 1. Marginal impact of a commitment to public-private relationships on 
productive efficiency contingent on administrative capacity 
-
.
01
-
.
00
5
0
.
00
5
.
01
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Capacity
